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Abstract
We dene a notion of Kripke logical predicate for models of classical linear logic
A Kripke logical predicate on a type A will be a set of generalised elements of A
satisfying certain closure properties Denotations of proofs of A will be characterised
as those global elements of A satisfying all Kripke logical predicates on A
Key words denotational completeness linear logic Kripke
logical predicates
 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to prove a denotational completeness result for lin
ear logic as in  but by dierent more traditional tools of denotational
semantics namely logical predicates of varying arity aka Kripke logical pre
dicates	 These were introduced originally by A	 Jung and J	 Tiuryn in 
 for
the purpose of characterising those set theoretic functions which are denable
in typed calculus for arbitrary interpretations of the base type	
It is more or less folklore how to adapt the methods of 
 in order to char
acterise the denable morphisms for models in arbitrary cartesian closed
category C 	 The key idea is to consider logical predicates in
b
V the category
of presheaves over the category V of variable substitutions in C

 and then
to show that the denable generalised elements form such a Kripke logical
predicate	
The purpose of this paper is to adapt the JungTiuryn technique to Clas
sical Linear Logic CLL by identifying an appropriate notion of Kripke logical
predicate for it	 For an arbitrary model C of classical linear logic we charac
terise for arbitrary type A the proof objects of A
C
 i	e	 the global elements

partially sponsored by Esprit Working Group  Applied Semantics

The same technique has been used in  for the purpose of a categorical reconstruction
of normalisation by evaluation 	a la Berger
Schwichtenberg making use of a particular
Kripke logical predicate ensuring normalisation
c
 Published by Elsevier Science B V
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Streicher
of A
C
arising as denotations of proofs of A as those global elements of A
C
contained in all Kripke logical predicates P
B
A on the generalised elements of
A
C
where B ranges over certain wellbehaved sets of generalised elements
of 
C
	 Notice that generalised elements of A are objects of A relative to
an arbitrary context whereas global elements of A are those elements of A
relative to the empty context	
Our Kripke logical predicates P
B
appear as particular instances of the more
general notion introduced recently in  for ILL Intuitionistic Linear Logic	
However making intrinsic use of linear negation typical for CLL our restricted
class of Kripke logical predicates can be dened in a simpler way appearing
as a proofrelevant version of Girards phase semantics for linear logic as in
 where our wellbehaved B  
C
correspond to the arbitrary subsets
of the monoid in loccit	 As phase semantics is already builtin to our
approach we can avoid adding it as an additional component as in 	
In section  we dene our notion of Kripke logical predicate for arbitrary
models of CLL without quantiers	 In section  we show soundness i	e	 that
proof objects satisfy all logical predicates under consideration	 In section  we
show denotational completeness i	e	 that every element satisfying all Kripke
logical predicates appears as the denotation of some derivation	 In particular
we show that for every type A we have PrA  P
Pr
A where for arbitrary
formulas C the set PrC consists of those generalised elements of C appearing
as denotations of derivations	 In section  we sketch how our characterisation
of proof objects can be used to build denotationally complete models where
every type contains only proof objects	 Finally in section  we compare our
proof method with the original one of  and discuss the relevance of our
achievements	
We think that our proof of denotational completenessbesides its simplicity
provides a new though not unexpected link between traditional techniques of
denotational semantics and linear logic in the sense that methods of the former
may be fruitfully applied to the study of the latter	 Although the skeleton of
our proof follows quite closely the pattern of 
 or rather its adaptation to
general models as given by cccs the esh around this skeleton is fresh as we
have to dene a new notion of Kripke logical predicate for Classical Linear Lo
gic which amounts to a proofrelevant version of Girards phase semantics	
Moreover our proofs are not just a straightforward adaptation of those of 

as the basic ingredients of classical linear logic are fairly dierent from typed
calculus	
 Kripke Logical Predicates
In this section we dene a notion of Kripke logical predicate for models of
quantierfree classical linear logic referred to simply as linear logic for the
rest of this paper	 Readers not feeling at ease with general categorical models
of linear logic may well think of their favourite concrete model for example

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the coherence space model of  without missing anything essential	 For a
precise denition of categorical model for Linear Logic see  or rather the
corrected version in  though the dierence is not relevant for our purposes
as we do not consider equality of proof terms	
For ease of exposition we sometimes employ a sided sequent calculus for
linear logic because this does not make any dierence w	r	t	 the interpreta
tion of derivations the socalled proof objects	 Accordingly we distinguish
between left contexts   and right contexts   which are interpreted dier
ently
A

     A
n
  A

    A
n

 A

     A
n
  A

    A
n
 
Nevertheless in the rest of the paper we will often omit semantic brackets
i	e	 for formulas A of linear logic we often write A for A the interpretation of
A e	g	 in the coherence space model	 Moreover if  is a sequence of formulas
we often write simply  for   or   and it hopefully  will always
be clear from the context what is the intended reading	 Moreover we freely
identify A with A

which is valid in most models as e	g	 the coherence space
model	
Denition  Let C be the underlying category of a model of linear logic
eg the category of coherence spaces and linear maps and V be the subcategory
of C whose objects are denotations of left contexts of linear logic and whose
morphisms are denotations of proofs using only the structural rules of weak
ening contraction

and permutation The morphisms of V will be refered to
as variable substitutions
For a type A a generalised element of A at stage  is a linear map A


We write GEA for the collection of all generalised elements of A at arbit
rary stage  and GEA for the collection of generalised elements of A at
stage  If P  GEA then we write P  for the collection of all generalised
elements of A at stage  that are contained in P 
A subset P  GEA will be called stable i P is closed under variable
substitutions ie a    P  whenever a  P  and     in V
A typical example of a stable subset of GEA is given by the collection
of socalled proof objects of A	
Denition  Let A be a type ie formula of linear logic An element of
GEA is called a proof object if it is of the form  where  is a proof
of   A We write PrA for the stable subset of GEA consisting of proof
objects of A
Kripke logical predicates on A will be certain stable subsets of GEA
which however will be required to be denotational facts w	r	t	 some arbit
rary stable subset of GE	

which of course are only applicable to banged formulas

ie more precisely a morphism from   to A in C

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Denition  If a  GEA b  GEA

 we write h a j b i for ev  a  b
in GE where ev  AA

 is the linear evaluation map


Let B be a stable subset of GE For a  GEA b  GEA

 we say that
a 
B
b i h a j b i  B If P  GEA then P

B
is the set of all b  GEA


such that a 
B
b for all a  A
A denotational Bfact of A or Kripke logical predicate on A of kind B is a
subset P  GEA with P  P

B

B

Lemma  If B is a stable subset of GE then all denotational B	facts
of A are stable
Proof Let P  P

B

B
 GEA	 For showing stability of P suppose that
a  P  and   V	 But then a    P  P

B

B
 too as for
b  P

B
 we have ev  a b  h a j b i  B and therefore also
h a   j b i  ev  a   b  ev  a b     B
as B is stable by assumption and variable substitutions are closed under 	
Now we will dene for every stable subset B of GE a Kripke logical
predicate of kind B on the model under consideration	
Denition  Let B be a stable subset of GE Now we de
ne a Kripke
logical relation P
B
endowing every formula A with a denotational B	fact P
B
A
by recursion on the complexity of formulas as follows

P
B
  B

P
B
  B

B

P
B
AB  fa b j a  P
B
A b  P
B
Bg

B

B

P
B
AB  fa b j a  P
B
A

 b  P
B
B

g

B

P
B
  GE

P
B
  GE

B

P
B
A	B  finlaja  P
B
Ag 
 finrbjb  P
B
Bg

B

B

P
B
AB  finlaja  P
B
A

g 
 finrbjb  P
B
B

g

B

P
B
A  f proma j a  P
B
Ag

B

B

P
B
A  f proma j a  P
B
A

g

B

where proma  a  
	
for a  GEA where       is the comul
tiplication of the comonad  and proma is unde
ned if the stage of a is not
a banged context ie not of the form 


The following properties are easily established for arbitrary P
B
	 Notice that
from now on we often write fa for ev  f  a whenever f  GEAB
and a  GEA	

Eg in the coherence space model we have evz   i x x  z for all x  jAj

The acronym prom refers to promotion rule

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Lemma  For every stable B subset of GE and formulas AB we have
that
 P
B
A

B
 P
B
A


 P
B
AB  fab j   a  P
B
A  b  P
B
Bg
 f  P
B
AB i a  P
B
A fa  P
B
B
 f  P
B
ABC i a  P
B
A b  P
B
B fa b  P
B
C
 f  P
B
AB i a  P
B
A fproma  P
B
B
 id

 P
B

Proof Claim  is obvious from the denition of P
B
	
For  suppose that c  GEAB	 Then we have c  P
B
AB i
h c j inla i  h pr

 c j a i  B for all a  P
B
A

 and h c j inrb i  h pr


c j b i  B for all b  P
B
B

 i	e	 i pr

 c  P
B
A and pr

 c  P
B
B	
For  suppose that f  GEAB  GEA

B	 Then f  P
B
A

B
i h f j a b i  ev  ev  f  a b  B for all a  P
B
A and b  P
B
B


i	e	 i fa  ev  f  a  P
B
B for all a  P
B
A	
Claim  is immediate from  as GEABC  GEABC	
For  suppose that f  GEAB  GEAB

	 Applying
the already established equivalence  twice we get that f  P
B
AB 
P
B
AB

 i fcb  B for all c  P
B
A and b  P
B
B

	 Now
for arbitrary but xed b  P
B
B

 we have c Afcb  P
B
A 
P
B
A

  f proma j a  P
B
A g

B
if and only if fpromab 
hcAfcb j proma i  B for all a  P
B
A	 Thus f  P
B
AB i
fpromab  B for all b  P
B
B

 and a  P
B
A i	e	 i fproma 
P
B
B for all a  P
B
A	
For 
 we have to show that h b j id

i  B all b  B	 If b     then
h b j id

i  b  where  is the canonical isomorphism between  and 	 As
 is a variable substitution and B is stable it follows that h b j id

i  b    B
as b  B by assumption	 
Notice that by  and  of the previous lemma 	
 we get that our
notion of Kripke logical predicate conservatively extends the usual one for
simply typed calculus as intuitionistic application is a particular case of
linear application	
Notice also that our Kripke logical predicates are instances of M	 Hasegawas
notion of Kripke logical predicates for models of intuitionistic linear logic as
described in 

	 However we dene Kripke logical predicates for the full
quantierfree part of classical linear logic where the presence of an involutive
linear negation allows for considerable simplications	

where we instantiate Hasegawas Iby the inclusion of the symmetric monoidal category
V into the symmetric monoidal closed category C

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 Soundness
In this section we prove that proof objects i	e	 global elements of the form 
satisfy all Kripke logical predicates	 In the next section we show the reverse
inclusion	
Before we embark on the proof of the soundness theorem we introduce a
notational convention that will prove useful in the sequel	 If   A

     A
n
then we write 

and  for A


     A

N
and A

     A
n
 respectively	
Theorem  	Soundness

If  is a proof of  A

     A
n
then   P
B
A

    A
n
 for all stable
B  GE
Proof Let B be a stable subset of GE	 We proceed by induction on
structure of derivation 	
Axiom If  is obtained by one application of the rule axiom then  
id
A
	 From Lemma 	
 it follows that id
A
 P
B
AA as for all a  P
B
A
we have that id
A
a  a  P
B
A	
Permutation Suppose that 

is a derivation of A

     A
n
satisfying the
induction hypothesis 

  P
B
A

     A
n
	 Let  be the derivation of the
formula A
i

    A
i
n
obtained from 

by applying the permutation rule in
stantiated by permutation i	 Let   A

    A
n
 A
i

    A
i
n
be the iso
morphic variable substitution induced by the permutation i then   

	
For showing that   P
B
A
i

    A
i
n
 assume that a
i
 P
B
A

i
 for
i       n	 But then
h   

 j a
i

    a
i
n
i  h 

 j a

    a
n
i  B
as 

  P
B
A

    A
n
 by induction hypothesis	
Cut Suppose that 

and 

are proofs of  A and A

 respectively
satisfying the induction hypotheses 

  P
B
 A  P
B


A and 

 
P
B
A

  P
B
A	
Let  be the proof of  obtained from 

and 

by application of the
rule cut	 Then   

  

    

	 By Lemma 	
 for
  P
B


 it suces to show that g  



g  P
B

for every g  P
B


	 But this latter condition holds as by the induction
hypotheses and Lemma 	
 both 

 and 

 preserve P
B
under linear
application	
 Suppose that 

and 

are proofs of  A and  B respectively
satisfying the induction hypotheses 

 P
B
 A  P
B


A and 


P
B
 B  P
B


B	 Then for the proof  of  AB obtained from


and 

by application of the rule  we have that   

 

	
For showing that   P
B
 A B  P
B




A B it suces
by Lemma 	
 to show that gd  

g 

d  P
B
AB for
all g  P
B


 and d  P
B


	 This however is the case as by induction
hypothesis and Lemma 	
 we have that 

g  P
B
A and 

d 
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P
B
B	
 If  is the derivation consisting of one application of the rule  then
  id

which is in P
B
 by Lemma 	

	
  For the rule  nothing has to be shown as if 

is a proof of  AB
and  is obtained from 

by one application of the rule  then by denition
we have   

   AB   AB	
 Suppose 

is a proof of  and satises the induction hypothesis


  P
B
  P
B


	 Then for the proof  of  obtained from


by application of the rule  we have that  is the global element of


 such that g  h 

 j g i for all g  GE

	
For showing that   P
B
  P
B


 it suces to show that
g  h 

 j g i  P
B
  B for all g  P
B


 which however holds by
induction hypothesis on 

	
 Suppose that 

and 

are derivations of  A

and  A

 respectively
satisfying the induction hypotheses 
i
  P
B
 A
i
  P
B


A
i
 i   	
Then for the derivation  of  A

A

obtained from 

and 

by application
of the rule  we have that   



	
For showing that   P
B
 A

A

  P
B


A

A

 suppose that g 
P
B


	 Then g  



g  

g

g  P
B
A

A

 by
Lemma 	
 as by induction hypothesis we have that pr
i
 g  
i
g 
P
B
 A
i
  P
B


A
i
	
 Let  be the derivation of  obtained by application of the rule
	 Then  is the unique morphism from 

to 	
For showing that   P
B
  P
B


 suppose that g  P
B


	
But g  GE  P
B
	
	 Suppose that 

is a derivation of  A satisfying the induction hypo
thesis 

  P
B
 A  P
B


A	 Then for the derivation  of  A 	 B
obtained from 

by application of the left introduction rule for 	 we have
that   inl  

	
For showing that   P
B
 A 	 B  P
B


A 	 B suppose that
g  P
B


	 Then g  inl  

  g  inl

  g  P
B
A 	 B as by
induction hypothesis on 

we have that 

  g  P
B
A and therefore we
have g  inl

  g  finlaja  P
B
Ag 
 finrbjb  P
B
Bg

B

B

P
B
A	B	
The proof for the right introduction rule is analogous	
Weakening Suppose that 

is a derivation of  satisfying induction hy
pothesis 

  P
B
	 Let  be the derivation of A obtained from 

by
application of the weakening rule	 Then   

w
A
 where w
A
  A


is the counit of the commutative comonoid A

	
For showing that   P
B
A  P
B
A

 by Lemma 	
 suppose
that c  P
B
A

	 Then promc  

w
A
 promc  

w


P
B
 as by induction hypothesis 

  P
B
 and P
B
 is stable	
Contraction Suppose that 

is a derivation of A A satisfying the
induction hypothesis 

  P
B
A A  P
B
A

A

	 Then the

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interpretation of the proof  obtained from 

by application of the contraction
rule is   

  c
A
 where c
A
 is the comultiplication of the commutative
comonoid A

	
For showing that   P
B
A  P
B
A

 by Lemma 	
 sup
pose that c  P
B
A

	 Then promc  

  c
A
  promc 


  promc promc  c

 P
B
 as P
B
 is stable and 

promc
promc  P
B
 by induction hypothesis on 

and promc  promc 
P
B
A

A

	
Deriliction Suppose that 

is a proof of A satisfying induction hypo
thesis 

  P
B
A  P
B
A

	 Let  be the proof of A obtained
from 

by the dereliction rule	 Then   

  read
A
  A

 where
read
A
  A

A

is the counit of the comonad  at A

	
For showing that   P
B
A  P
B
A

 by Lemma 	
 it suf
ces to show that promc  P
B
 for all c  P
B
A

	 Suppose that
c  P
B
A

	 Then promc  

  read
A
  promc  

  c  P
B

by induction hypothesis on 

	
Promotion Suppose that 

is a derivation of  A satisfying the in
duction hypothesis 

  P
B
 A  P
B


A	 Then for the proof 
of  A obtained from 

by application of the promotion rule  we have
  prom

	
For showing that   P
B
 A  P
B


 A by Lemma 	
 it suf
ces to show that promg  P
B
B for all g  P
B


	 Now suppose that
g  P
B


	 Then promg    promg  prom

  promg 
prom

  promg  P
B
A as 

  promg  P
B
A by Lemma 	

the induction hypothesis on 

and promg  P
B


 as g  P
B


	 
 Denotational Completeness
In this section we are going to prove the reverse implication to the Soundness
Theorem 	 i	e	 completness saying that a global element a of A is a proof
object i a considered as a generalised element at stage  is contained in
P
B
A for all stable B  GE	 Actually we will prove something stronger
namely that PrA  P
Pr
A for all types A	
But before we have to establish some properties of PrA	
Lemma  For every type A we have that
 PrA  fid
A
g

Pr
 PrA

  PrA

Pr

Proof The rst claim holds as for a  GEA we have that h a j id
A

i 
ev  a  id
A
  Pr i a  PrA as a  curryev  a  id
A
 and
generalised elements coming from proofs are closed under currying	
Now to the second claim	 Due to  we have PrA

  fid
A
g

Pr
	 As
h id
A
j id
A
 i  Pr we get fid
A
g  fid
A
g

Pr
 PrA

 from which it
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follows that PrA

Pr
 fid
A
g

Pr

Pr
 PrA

	 The reverse inclu
sion PrA

  PrA

Pr
holds as h f j a i  Pr whenever f  PrA


and a  PrA	 
Theorem  For every formula A we have that PrA  P
Pr
A
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of A	
First notice that PrA  P
Pr
A entails PrA

  P
Pr
A

 as we have
PrA

  PrA

Pr
by Lemma 	 and P
Pr
A

Pr
 P
Pr
A


by Lemma 	
	 Notice that this observation reduces the number of cases
to be considered to the half	
As for the purposes of this proof we consider no other B than Pr there
is no danger of confusion when writing  

instead of  

Pr
to improve
readability	
 Pr  P
Pr
 by denition of P
Pr
	
 Suppose as induction hypothesis that PrA
i
  P
Pr
A
i
 for i   	
If c  PrA


A


 and a
i
 PrA
i
 then h c j a

 a

i  Pr	 Thus
PrA


A


  f a

 a

j a
i
 P
Pr
A
i
 g

from which it follows that fa


a

ja
i
 P
Pr
A
i
g

 PrA


A




	 As by Lemma 	 we have PrA


A

  PrA


A




it follows by denition of P
Pr
that P
Pr
A

A

 
PrA

A

	
As id
A

A

 id
A

id
A

 fa

 a

ja
i
 PrA
i
g we have that fa

a

j a
i

PrA
i
g

 fid
A

A

g

 PrA


A


	 Thus we get that PrA


A





fa

a

j a
i
 P
Pr
A
i
g

 P
Pr
A

A

	 As by Lemma 	 we have
PrA

A

  PrA


A




it follows that PrA

A

  P
Pr
A

A

	
 We have Pr  GE  P
Pr
 by denition P
Pr
	
 Suppose as induction hypothesis that PrA
i
  P
Pr
A
i
 for i   	
If c  PrA


	 A


 and a
i
 PrA
i
 then h c j a

a

i  Pr	 Thus
PrA


	A


  f a

a

j a
i
 P
Pr
A
i
 g

fromwhich it follows that fa

a

ja
i

P
Pr
A
i
g

 PrA


	A




	 As by Lemma 	 we have PrA

A

 
PrA


	A




and therefore P
Pr
A

A

  PrA

A

 by denition of
P
Pr
	
As id
A

A

 id
A

id
A

 fa

a

j a
i
 PrA
i
g we have fa

a

j a
i

PrA
i
g

 fid
A

A

g

 PrA


	 A


	 Thus we get PrA


	 A





fa

a

ja
i
 P
Pr
A
i
g

and therefore PrA

A

  P
Pr
A

A

 as
PrA

A

  PrA


A




by Lemma 		
 Suppose that PrA  P
Pr
A	
If c  PrA

 and a  PrA then h c j proma i  Pr	 Thus we
have PrA

  f proma j a  P
Pr
A g

from which it follows that
f proma ja  P
Pr
Ag

 PrA



	 As by Lemma 	 we have
PrA  PrA



it follows by denition of P
Pr
that P
Pr
A 
PrA	
As id
A
 promread
A
  f proma j a  PrA g we have f proma j a 
PrAg

 fid
A
g

 PrA

 from which it follows that PrA




f proma j a  P
Pr
Ag

	 Thus we have PrA  P
Pr
A as PrA 
!
Streicher
PrA



by Lemma 		 
Theorem  	Completeness

A global element a of A ie a  GEA is a proof object of A if and only
if a  P
B
A for all stable B  GE
Proof Immediate from the Soundness Theorem 	 and the Theorem 		
 A Denotationally Complete Model
Up to now we have used biorthogonal closed Kripke logical predicates for
characterising proof objects i	e	 those global elements of types that arise as
interpretations of formal derivations	 As usual one may adapt such a charac
terisation into a construction of a denotationally complete model as was done
also by J	Y	 Girard in 	 Although for this purpose we might start with
an arbitrary model C of linear logic however for reasons of concreteness we
further assume that C is the widely known coherence space model described
e	g	 in 	 Again we write V for the nonfull subcategory of C of variable
substitutions between denotations of contexts	
Denition  Let M be the category which is de
ned as follows
An object of M is a pair A  jAj P A where jAj is a coherence space and
P A is a family indexed by stable subsets B of GE such that P A
B
is a
Kripke logical predicate on jAj of kind B A morphism in M from A to B is
a linear map f  jAj  jBj such that f  a  P B
B
for all stable B  GE
and a  P A
B

This category M can be endowed with the structure of a model of linear lo
gic using that C itself is a model of linear logic and constructing the Kripke
logical predicates as described in De
nition  The required morphisms are
constructed as in C and turn out to preserve all the required Kripke logical
relations due to the Soundness Theorem 
Now the following is immediate	
Theorem  	Denotational Completeness

If A is a type and a is a global section of A
M
in M then there exists a
derivation  of A such that 
M
 a
Proof If a is a global element of A
M
in M then  by construction of M
 a is a global element of A
C
in C satisfying all Kripke logical predicates	
Therefore by Theorem 	 it follows that a  
C
 
M
for some derivation
 of A	 
Notice that this model M is not extensional although it is denotationally
complete	 This situation is comparable to the situation in game semantics
where one constructs intensionally full abstract models that are not exten
sional though all morphism in the model arise as interpretations of terms	
One might try to remedy this situation by restricting the coherence spaces
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to those elements which are invariant under all Kripke logical relations but
unfortunately these restrictions are not coherence spaces anymore	

 Discussion
We consider our characterisation of proof objects via Kripke logical predicates
for arbitrary models of linear logic as an alternative to J	Y	 Girards char
acterisation of proof objects in the coherence space model using monoids
combined with ordinary phase semantics see 	 His characterisation of proof
objects is absolutley syntaxfree whereas in our account we make essential
use of the category V of variable substitutions which might be regarded as a
very faint shadow of syntax	 But V is so trivial compared to the collection
of all proof objects that we think it is not mere cheating what we achieved	
However as a reward for cheating a bit when using Vwe gain the following
advantages	
Firstly our proof of completeness is fairly simple compared to Girards
rather complicated construction of an appropriate monoid in his paper On
Denotational Completeness  	 Moreover our methode works for arbitrary

models of linear logic and not only for the coherence space model	
Secondly we perfectly can avoid considering an additional phase semantics
component as this appears to be built in already	 Namely if A is a coherence
space with an empty web

then in Girards approach for every monoid P
there is only the empty clique in PA which forces him to add an ordinary
monoid M providing the phase semantics component needed to distinguish
those empty cliques which are proof objects from the empty cliques that dont
arise as interpretations of proofs	 In our approach there is no need for this
as denotational facts of an A with empty web are simply in obvious 
correspondence with certain sets of contexts as GEA


jVj if jAj  	 In
particular under this identication a denotational Bfact of A is nothing but
a fact w	r	t	 the monoid of contexts under concatenation with   B	
Finally notice that in the sense of logical complexity our characterisa
tion of proof objects in the coherence space model by some sort of invariants
does not provide simpler characterisation than the obvious one as syntactic
denablity which obviously is an r	e	 condition on nite cliques whereas ours
is of much higher logical complexity	 Nevertheless a characterisation of syn
tactic denablity by invariants may be considered as more elegant in the
sense that one avoids any reference to syntax	 But this is a merely aesthetic
criterion which probably cannot be given a precise mathematical meaning	
In particular the achievements of denotational completeness do not seem to

When constructing fully abstract models of PCF this methods works because the closure
of a subset of cpo is a cpo again provided it contains the least element Unfortunately
coherence spaces are not so robust under taking substructures
	
as eg Chu spaces or dePaivas Dialectica categories


as eg those of the form A  A  A and A

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throw any light on the following question
Is it decidable whether a clique in the coherence space model comes from a
proof 
Full completness results of another avour have been obtained e	g	 in
A	 M	 Tans PhD Thesis   where it is proved that every dinatural trans
formation on an arbitrary model of multiplicative linear logic MLL as e	g	
in particular the coherence space model appears as denotation of a proof in
MLL	 As all denotations of derivations in MLL give rise to dinatural trans
formations these are precisely the proof objects of MLL	 Alas this doesnt give
any handle on the question above as dinatural transformations are inherently
innite objects and furthermore it is not clear how to extend her results to all
linear connectives in particular the exponentials	 However a comparison and
integration of both approaches is a topic worthwhile for future investigation	
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